The paper maintains that biotechnology regions develop as complex systems: they start with star scientists in research universities, generating knowledge spillovers, then move progressively towards regional technology markets. In the process they attract venture capital (or modify the behaviour of existing venture capital firms with the addition of biotechnology portfolios). The routines of universities are also modified with the addition of intellectual property and technology transfer offices intervening as sellers in the newly created knowledge markets. The paper also considers whether companies located in regional agglomerations grow faster than isolated ones, and whether companies spun-off from universities have a better performance than start-ups. The study is based on about 90 Canadian-based publicly quoted biotechnology companies.
Introduction
Regional systems of innovation (RSIs) 1 are geographical concentrations of interacting organisations (innovative firms, research universities, government laboratories and venture capital firms) aimed at the development of a specific technology. In the case of biotechnology, for example, RSIs are located along the West Coast of the USA (Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco) and the East Coast (Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Washington, DC). Typically, the concentration of biotech firms in these RSIs occurs around research universities and venture capital pools (Swan et al., 1998; Niosi & Bas, 2001 ). Questions such as why biotechnology firms agglomerate precisely in these areas, and how such RSIs are formed, are the subject of intense debate, with several theories being offered. Labour pools made up of graduates of research universities, knowledge spillovers from academia to industry, complementary and input markets for university-created technologies, trust and reciprocity, as well as reduced transaction costs within the network, have all been put forward as explanations Zucker et al, 1998A, B) for the clustering of key organisations within a particular geographical region.
Many of these theoretical approaches have been advanced independently of one another in spite of their natural complementarities. The spillover effects, proposed by Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) for example, do not recognise the roles that trust and reciprocity (Storper, 1995) play in developing a new invention despite it being a natural consequence of the frequent exchanges that may occur as a result of colocation to an innovation partner. During the early phases of invention, social norms such as informal (i.e., non-market) exchanges can be what enable firms to exploit successfully such knowledge spillovers as may occur, for example, where there is a high concentration of skilled labour. We argue that such complementarities are a natural consequence of the processes of knowledge accumulation and the responses of rational investors; scientists learn about the source of competences, and investors obtain information about opportunities from market signals. Accordingly, they are correlated with one another and driven by an evolutionary process that may be paraphrased as follows. At first, RSIs begin as a network of informal information exchanges (e.g., among scientists in different university laboratories). They then undergo a metamorphosis of some kind, in which formal markets emerge and begin to take over some of the roles of informal information channels. In particular, during the infancy of an RSI, externalities play a relatively more important role, while as the RSI reaches maturity, strategic factor markets begin to play a relatively more important role in fostering innovation. Applying this logic, one would therefore expect that innovation in a more mature RSI would follow a path of rapid entry into the market and commercialisation of new inventions, owing to the presence of a number of well-defined factor markets for venture capital and specialised labour.
An evolutionary approach to understanding the role and function of RSIs is, therefore, a means of integrating several contributing but disparate views about the mechanisms by which innovation clusters function. In this paper, we outline some of the indicators that may be used to determine how clusters evolve and present some performance measures to compare the relative performance of clusters in different stages of evolution. Our goal is to provide some empirical evidence for the process of evolutionary change described here. In Section 1 we begin by presenting an overview of some of the contributing theories of regional agglomeration and its dynamics. In Section 2, we present research hypotheses tested on a sample of Canadian biotechnology firms. The results of our analysis appear in Section 3, while a discussion of the findings is presented in Section 4. Conclusions are presented in the final section.
Regional agglomeration and its dynamics
Over the last ten years, both RSIs and research-intensive firms have been the subject of an ever-increasing number of empirical studies and theoretical explanations. On the basis of the traditional approaches of Alfred Marshall, Franc xois Perroux and others, a plethora of authors have uncovered different phenomena pertaining to innovation in geographic clusters (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Martin, 1999; Meardon, 2001 ). These phenomena have been described in terms of:
1. Knowledge flows. Authors have distinguished between knowledge flows occurring between organisations located within the clusters and those occurring between clusters and external organisations. Knowledge transmission is less costly and more effective within clusters (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) because even wellcodified information, especially when it pertains to innovation, always has a tacit component to it (Polanyi, 1966) . Proximity of the producer and the receiver of such information facilitates transmission and absorption of information because frequent exchanges between such partners prevent the tacit component from being lost in the exchange. Furthermore, because tacit information is more likely to be lost if it must be transmitted through several agents, being in the same geographical area helps to prevent the 'broken telephone' phenomenon.
2. Heterogeneity of organisations. RSIs, being a type of cluster dedicated to innovation, are characterised by a multitude of scientific, technological, financial and other types of knowledge flows (Lawson, 1999) . Very different types of organisations, such as developers, users, financial institutions, government laboratories and universities, produce knowledge within innovation clusters (Cooke et al., 1998; Porter, 1998 Porter, , 2001 . Thus, the heterogeneity of organisations and the knowledge flows required for the development of a new invention can create a complex management problem. Co-location both facilitates access to a variety of complementary organisations, and simplifies the coordination among them. Being located within the same region facilitates information exchange and increases the likelihood that the organisations, being as diverse as they may be, will nonetheless operate according to a shared set of norms (e.g., firms operating in university incubators expect other firms in their environment to operate according to a shared set of rules, because, for example, they share common facilities).
3. Externalities. Some of the knowledge flows described above are pure externalitiesbenefits (or losses) that some economic agents impose on others, not captured by market transactions (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Feldman, 1999) . Localised knowledge externalities, for example, reduce the cost of discovery to other firms situated in the same region. Although they may share many of the same properties of knowledge flows embodied in formal technology transfer agreements, patent licenses, the creation of spin-offs and the like (Zucker et al., 1998) , in general they cannot be observed using conventional variables such as the value of a licensing agreement or an acquired organisation.
Finally, even though externalities, heterogeneity of organisations and knowledge flows cover a vast array of specific causal factors for the formation of RSIs, they do not explicitly account for change-a critical factor in explaining the emergence of RSIs. In this regard, it is perhaps useful to consider how a few of the main organisational theories might be applied to explaining the evolution of RSIs.
At one extreme, population ecologists would argue that the size and growth of the agglomeration of complementary organisations is explained by the differential rates of survival of competing groups of organisations within the cluster. Given that each organisation (within the cluster) is born with a specific set of routines, those bearing the most 'isomorphic' routines (i.e., ideally suited to their environment) will survive while others will disappear (Carroll and Hannan, 1995) . At any given time, the constitution of an RSI is thus a reflection of the relative survival and mortality rates of different types of organisations. Thus, in a human health RSI, for example, where the environment supports the development of organisations having routines particular to human biotechnology but not ag-biotechnology, the latter will tend to disappear while the number of human health biotechnology organisations will grow. This approach would furthermore argue that organisations that are more prone to leverage externalities of a specific kind are more likely to survive, while those that are less absorptive will die.
While one appeal of the ecological perspective is that it speaks to the differences in characteristics of organisations, it presents several difficulties. Most troubling is that organisations-usually the most rapidly growing-are able to change their routines, not to mention acquire new technologies and competences. Organisational learning is a major stimulus to change (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahar and George, 2002) and companies conducting R&D are usually more apt to learn (thus leveraging regional externalities) because they have in place routines and procedures that can accommodate non-routine procedures of search and inductive logic. In the case of biotechnology, for example, developments in the scientific base that occur in universities, private firms and government laboratories usually result in relatively quick changes in the stock of human capital, because such organisations have hiring policies that emphasise specific technical and research skills. Thus, biotechnology RSIs (and, of course other RSIs specialised in science-based industries) evolve because the core scientific knowledge they exploit evolves, but also because firms are able to acquire this knowledge rapidly and effect changes in their organisational routines and technologies. In this regard, we may add that a similar process may occur for managerial competences in venture capital and other private sector organisations.
While the migration of employees is one mechanism of evolution, knowledge flows can be another. The phenomenon of knowledge flows is perhaps best addressed by organisational network theory. According to this perspective, the evolution of networks occurs as actors accumulate experience and information about other members of the network through repeated experiences (Gulati, 1998) . So-called 'structural holes' (Burt, 1992) represent opportunities for one agent to broker some untapped potential by formalising a relationship between two other agents. The idiosyncratic knowledge of the broker thus provides a means for the two other parties to realise some untapped potential, much the way a real estate agent brings together buyers and sellers of properties. RSIs thus evolve when local network agents learn about each other's competences and adjust their behaviour so as to be able to exploit the complementarities provided by other agents in their vicinity.
Evolutionary economics emphasises the role of path dependence and cumulative processes in explaining industry structure and dynamics (Arthur, 1994) . In RSIs, star scientists may move closer to research universities where other stars have established a path of technological development. Similarly, venture capital firms may co-locate with other like firms initiating reinforcing positive feedback dynamics (i.e., venture capital firms competing against each other but also cooperating in the financing of promising new start ups) that tend to favour some regions but weaken others. Evolutionary economics also suggest that in complex systems 1 (such as RSIs) organisations co-evolve on the basis of their interactions (Barkley Rosser, 2003) . Thus, we should expect research universities to become increasingly engaged in entrepreneurship after an initial experience with venture capital firms and the latter become more interested in biotechnology due to their experience with biotechnology university spin-offs.
These diverse perspectives suggest why the nature of exchanges between agents need not be fixed, but instead evolve over time. Even in the case of ecological models, where agents are assumed not to be able to adapt, one can expect that the nature of exchanges will be different because the distribution of trading partners changes over time as a result of environmental selection. What remains unanswered, however, is whether such patterns of change occur in emerging science-based industries. It remains to be understood whether RSIs have evolved as a result of markets taking over the role of informal networks, and how this pattern may be manifested in terms of key performance variables of growth and innovation. These propositions are formalised in the next section in terms of research hypotheses.
Research hypothesis
We hypothesise that, during the initial formation of these biotech RSIs, knowledge externalities abound and that, since firms cannot internalise them, well-defined markets for knowledge flows (i.e., licenses for technologies, equity positions in R&D organisations) are uncommon. Later, however, as a result of accumulated experience and the capability of firms and other organisations to internalise their knowledge better and trade it, formal strategic factor markets emerge. Once such markets are in place, they provide efficiency advantages to the organisations within the RSI.
This path of development of the biotech RSIs is due the complexity of the management of R&D programs. In the case of biotechnology, for example, the relatively high importance of networks at the outset is attributed to the fact that it is difficult to determine the economic value of such technologies when they are only beginning to be recognised by pioneers in university and public laboratories. As a result, venture capital firms, having made their debut in information technologies, were slow to learn to assess the risks and value of star scientists in biotechnology (Kenney, 2000) . Universities, despite having a good technical and scientific understanding of such inventions, were slow to manage their own intellectual property and to make the organisational changes required to allow research scientists to commercialise their biotech spin-off enterprises. For these reasons, the formal markets relating to biotechnology (including venture capital and labour) did not emerge spontaneously but appeared gradually over the past 20 years, both in Canada and in the USA. The characteristics of this evolution from knowledge spillovers to knowledge markets include: 1. A reduction in uncertainty regarding the patent ability of certain biotechnology inventions as a result of landmark court decisions of the higher courts such as the CAFC (e.g. Diamond v. Chakrabarty 1 , Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.
2 ).
2. An increasing number of biotechnology patents and licenses granted, suggesting that information can be appropriated and traded in well-defined markets. 3. Growth in the number of intellectual property offices in universities and government laboratories. 4. Increasing abundance of venture capital funds attributed to biotechnology, including an increasing number of initial public offerings (IPOs) for new biotech firms.
We thus hypothesise that:
H1: Formal markets (for technologies, venture capital, and labour) appeared progressively in RSIs in the 1990s only when the commercial value of biotechnology was more accurately evaluated.
In terms of specific mechanisms, the tacit component of knowledge (i.e., know how, that remained unpublished or not very well understood because it was just emerging from research laboratories) became externalised only after the 1990s. To the neoclassical micro-behavioural assumption of perfectly rational agents, we oppose the theory that economic agents are bounded rational and their adjustment is not instantaneous. Instead, economic agents progressively adjust their behaviour in the face of opportunities and threats.
If clusters, or more specifically RSIs, provide firms with more information at lower cost, either through externalities or through market transactions, then firms in clusters should perform better than firms located outside clusters. Thus, our second hypothesis is that: H2: Firms in clusters display better performance (they are more innovative, display a higher growth rate) than firms outside clusters.
As mentioned earlier, universities are believed to play a central role in biotechnology clusters, because they are repositories of specialised knowledge. Universities provide an open environment for the exchange of information, which facilitates the diffusion of critical tacit knowledge. Thus, small biotech firms (SBFs) spun off from universities should be those that are better able to commercialise their inventions and appropriate them using, for example, the patent system, compared to start-up firms or spin-offs from other types of organisations. Thus, our third hypothesis posits that:
H3: University spin-offs perform better (in terms of patent licenses and employee growth) than other types of specialised biotechnology firms.
Finally, since the development of biotech inventions is largely dependent upon a number of complementary inputs, the progressive internationalisation of these contributing input markets (e.g., sourcing of expertise from other countries) should coincide with the internationalisation of biotech product markets-the rationale being that supplying countries of the technology should also be users of it. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is that: H4: Technology markets become progressively internationalised, as both SBFs and venture capital firms learn to make international transactions in the new technology.
Empirical analysis
To test these hypotheses, we have gathered information from different sources on SBFs in Canada 1 and the USA. Our Canadian sample used to test the specific research consists of 90 publicly-traded Canadian biotechnology firms as of May 2002. Approximately one-third of the firms (31) are known to be university spin-offs. Summary statistics on the number of SBFs in each major Canadian city, the proportion resulting from university spin-offs, their average age as of 2002, the year corresponding to the largest number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the region and average employment appear in Table 1 .
Three-quarters of the companies are situated in the three largest RSIs, namely, Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. When it comes to university spin-offs, Toronto and Montreal show a surprisingly low percentage of publicly-traded companies emerging from local universities, probably because there are many other organisations within these regions that are able to incubate new biotechnology firms, such as research hospitals and large pharmaceutical laboratories. Another possible explanation is that we have underestimated the number of university spin-offs as a result of older spin-offs not being properly identified in current databases and because universities in these areas have only recently begun to track the creation of their own spin-offs 2 .
4.1 Hypothesis 1: the progressive organisation of venture capital and technology markets Data on the founding dates and year of IPO provide us with some evidence of the evolution of the biotech RSI. For example, as shown in Figure 1 , the time elapsed from foundation to IPO has consistently diminished over the years. The correlation between the age of the firm and number of months a firm waited before making an initial public offering on a major stock exchange is positive and highly significant (Pearson ¼ 0.60), suggesting that firms founded in the infancy of the RSI waited longer before going public. Our data indicate that companies founded before 1991 had to wait, on average, 111 months (over nine years) before going to the capital market. Those founded between 1991 and 1995, in contrast, waited on average 43 months (just over three and half years). Finally, those created between 1996 and 2001 appeared on the stock exchange on average only 18 months after their foundation. Thus, as venture capitalists learned to identify the characteristics of valuable companies, formal venture capital markets developed.
From 1991 to 2000, the annual amount invested in Canadian biotechnology firms grew from $10M to C$684M, and over 97% of that amount went to human health biotechnology. The dramatic rise in Canadian venture capital invested in biotechnology shows that the financial market has come to value the new biotechnology in that it allocates an increasing share of funds to biotechnology firms. The share of biotechnology in the total amount invested by Canadian venture capital increased from 12% in 1999 to 18% in 2000 to 22% in 2001, according to the Canadian venture Capital Association.
In our sample, 57% of the university spin-offs had been, at least to some extent, financed by venture capital, compared with 46% of other public Canadian biotechnology companies. Thus, university spin-offs seem to have been at least as successful as other companies with respect to raising money from investors.
From the supply side, markets also become more organised. Both in the USA and in Canada, research universities have created offices of technology transfer over the last two decades. According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM, 2000) , almost 90% of all offices of technology licensing in the USA were created after 1980. AUTM explains this trend by the rise of university patents that followed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. Similarly, the number of university spin-offs increased dramatically after 1980. By 1999, 50 out of 84 (60%) universities reporting to Statistics Canada had an intellectual property (IP) management infrastructure in place with 62% of respondents actively managing IP.
Also, the development of five large national biotechnology laboratories in the late 1980s increased the supply of technology and the organisation of the markets. Three of them are specialised in human health, the application in which almost all the public 
Hypothesis 2: relative performance of firms within RSIs
How did companies in large clusters compare with those in smaller locations in terms of foundation, innovation and growth? In Vancouver, companies waited, on average, 39 months between foundation and IPO. In Montreal, it took, on average, 51 months, while in Toronto, it took 90 months (seven and a half years). Outside the three largest clusters (primarily in the Prairies and Western Canada), it took an average of 36 months from foundation to IPO, probably as a result of these younger companies emerging in the stock market at a time when venture capital markets were more developed. The conclusion here is that companies in the three large clusters do not seem to be at an advantage-in terms of speed to the stock markets-compared with SBFs outside of these main clusters. Firms outside the clusters have in some sense 'leapfrogged' the initial process of survival in a lean environment where there is scant venture capital funding.
As to the size of the IPO, the average amounts collected were C$19M in Vancouver, against C$15M in Montreal and C$12M in Toronto (Table 2 ). In smaller locations the picture is mixed. Companies located in Alberta had, on average, much smaller IPOs (C$8M in Edmonton and C$6M in Calgary). Conversely, those in Ontario and Quebec outside the largest clusters raised C$17.5M and C$20M, respectively, from their initial public offerings. Again, being in a metropolitan census region 1 does not seem to confer major advantages to SBFs in terms of the size of their IPOs, but being in a large province definitely does. The performance differences of clusters in Canada may therefore be attributed to the fact that larger provinces are better able to attract a critical mass of key resources such as star scientists, venture capital, investment bankers and specialised law firms.
Do companies in clusters innovate more? Table 3 summarises the situation. The number of patents is higher in companies in Ontario and Quebec located outside the main metropolitan census regions (MCRs). In Canada, the relevant geographical unit conferring advantages to firms seems to be the province rather than the MCR. This fact may be related to two different factors: one is the relatively small size of Canadian MCRs compared to equivalent American or European ones. The second is the important role of horizontal provincial innovation policies, at least in the largest provinces of Canada. Thus, companies in smaller locations of less populated provinces generally have fewer patents or none at all. The conclusion here is that the three largest provinces are good places to innovate and that companies in far away locations (the Maritimes and the Prairies, except Alberta) innovate less. A second dimension of performance-growth in employment-indicates a similar pattern. The majority of the firms in the three large clusters (but also other firms in any of the three large provinces) enjoyed growth-even as much as 50% between 1997 and 2002 (Table 4 ). The worst performance in terms of employment occurs outside of the clusters in firms in the Prairies. The conclusion seems to be that location is important, not so much in terms of large MCRs such as Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, but more in terms of the being in the right provinces, whatever the location inside these provinces.
Hypothesis 3: effect of university origins
Companies that are university spin-offs should have some advantages in both the time from foundation to IPO compared with other firms. They are also remarkably more inventive, as measured by the number of US patents obtained. However, as shown in Table 5 , the average amount of capital raised through IPO was slightly inferior to non-university spin-offs, while the difference in growth of employment was very large (19% over a five-year period, from 1997-2002, compared with 84% for nonuniversity spin-offs). University spin-offs perform better than non-university firms in the less populated provinces, such as the Prairies (except with respect to growth in employment), even though their performance is relatively inferior to the spin-offs in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. The slow growth of university spin-offs is curious, especially in light of their relatively favourable patenting and IPO record. One possible explanation is that such firms remain small because they remain committed to more fundamental (i.e., upstream) research, compared with other firms in the sample that might experience growth by engaging in downstream development.
Hypothesis 4: progressive internationalisation
More recently, foreign venture capital firms have started investing in Canadian SBFs. Even though the number of financing deals has been fairly small, the amounts invested were, on average, larger than those by Canadian venture capital (CVCA, 2001) In 2001, some C$1.1 billion were invested in life sciences companies in Canada. Foreign direct investment of C$1.6 billion represented 34% of all venture capital technology investments in 2001. Also, in 2001, 40% of Canadian venture capital funds invested in biotechnology were invested in overseas biotechnology firms, an all-time record.
Discussion
Our first hypothesis posited that biotechnology markets appeared progressively in the 1990s. Our analysis of the Canadian biotechnology sector lends support to this view and provides some additional insight. The progressive adoption of intellectual property (IP) management in Canadian and US universities, including the creation of IP and technology transfer offices, was a relatively widespread phenomenon. The emergence of these routines, only relatively recently, facilitated the creation of formal technology markets, because they made knowledge exchange possible, for example, .
through licensing agreements. Not only did universities come to understand the value of the new biotechnology, large pharmaceutical firms, eager to develop new products, also increased the number of alliances with SBFs and at the same time started their own in-house biotechnology research or acquired independent SBFs to obtain such new technology (Henderson et al., 1998) . We found that companies in the three large Canadian cities (Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver) performed better than companies outside clusters. Advantages seem to be related to the availability of venture capital and being located in a region (i.e., province in this case) with many complementary input markets. To appreciate the role of critical masses in creating such complementarities, consider for instance that the entire Quebec population is only 7.5 million-considerably less than the New York-New Jersey-Long Island metro area (20 million), the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County area (16 million) or the Chicago area (8.9 million) but comparable to the Washington-Baltimore (7.4 million) and the San Francisco-Oakland-San José (6.9 million) RSIs. A large population base for sustaining such biotechnology RSIs seems, therefore, not to be the exception, but rather the rule.
We found that even though other start-ups and spin-offs may have less direct access to knowledge and technology from universities, they apparently have other linkages that make up for this shortcoming and sustain growth.
1 As mentioned earlier, one possible explanation is that such firms may have a greater number of alliances with Percentage of firms with growth over 50% in employment for the reference period. The number of firms has diminished because data were unavailable or because some firms were dissolved.
other firms specialising in downstream development. Moreover, the pattern of alliance building and investment seems to increasingly take on greater international scope with time. International alliances with large pharmaceutical corporations are the main factor explaining growth in Canadian biotechnology firms (Niosi, 2003) .
Conclusion
Our analysis of the growth and dynamics of IPOs in Canadian biotech RSIs leads us to a few general conclusions. First, we would like to suggest that the growth and evolution of RSIs can be explained in terms of the existence of technology markets such as venture capital, labour markets and patent licenses. Only relatively recently, with the emergence of venture capital markets, were firms able to raise capital relatively quickly in order to fund their organisations. Thus, growth in some of the newer RSIs has essentially been 'jump started' in later years because a number of changes in the environment have translated knowledge flows previously exploited in terms of externalities into well-functioning markets. Some of these changes include, for example, the progressive adoption of intellectual property rules and the creation of technology transfer offices in research universities. Other changes involve the creation of technology co-development agreements, industry organisations and science parks. Taken together, they made it easier for new firms to appropriate knowledge inputs and sell knowledge-intensive products in well-defined markets. The above explanation does not mean that externalities disappear: tacit knowledge flows always exist, even when knowledge markets allow fairly explicit transactions. These local knowledge externalities would explain why patents and publication produced in one region remain cited in the same region more often than those produced elsewhere. Another way of restating our conclusions in the language of previous authors (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) is to say that during the formative stages of an RSI the main driving forces of growth were knowledge spillovers. In later years, however, the nature of contracting and cooperation evolved (to reduce transaction costs, and hold up, for example) resulting in the creation of a variety of markets for venture capital, labour and intellectual property. This process of self-organisation is a self-perpetuating process because as firms accumulate knowledge, they are more apt to transact in specific technology markets. This proposition implies that the importance of the spillover effect in explaining why firms locate in clusters may decline as the RSI evolves. In other words, over time the role of externalities diminishes in relation to strategic input markets. One may therefore ask if the presence of well-defined technology markets, and their ability to access them from outside the cluster, means that co-location will be an increasingly less important factor in explaining technological growth and development. We think that there is already evidence for this.Most of the established firms (> five years old) in our sample had alliance partners outside of their RSI, suggesting that at least some part of their development is exported or imported.
The question of the impact of social evolution Our findings lead us to suggest that an evolved biotechnology RSI will rely more on formal markets as a medium of exchange, be characterised by a quicker time from laboratory to market and to IPO, be more inventive (produce more patents per year), have more international sales and witness faster growth in employment. In mature RSIs, existing firms will tend to consolidate and strengthen as these winners absorb the resources and projects of the less successful SBFs. Also, as the RSI matures, the relative number of spin-offs from the private sector will increase in relation to university spin-offs, as existing firms produce 'second generation' spin-offs. Similarly, we expect some of the successful high-tech entrepreneurs to become important investors, thereby increasing the total amount of venture capital available to the RSI and increasing the local pool of talent. A similar 'induced effect' of economic growth has already been observed in Cambridge, UK following a 15-year period of sustained growth in the biotechnology sector (Segalquincewicksteed, 2000) .
Our rather simple analysis of a few indicators is exposed to the most obvious criticism that there are many other factors correlated with geographic location that have not been explicitly accounted for. It can be argued, therefore, that there is a lot of 'noise' in the variables we examined. While this is true, it is important to remember that the aim was not to determine the relative importance of a number of variables as they pertain to growth or to another variable. The objective was, instead, to understand how some dimensions of the operating environment such as equity funding and IP protection evolved over time, and whether this coincided with selected indicators of evolution, namely the time a firm waited to be become publicly-traded. In this sense, the analysis gives us an idea of the pattern, or causal factors of evolution, as related to age of the firms and other factors like university linkages.
While our research aimed to argue that RSIs evolve, future research establishing the relationship between the stage of development of a technology and the evolution of an RSI would help us to understand better how technologies structure markets. 
